Marquette Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 1 Fall 1984

Article 8

Torts: Child May Recover for Loss of Parent's
Society and Companionship. Theama v. City of
Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984)
Susan M. Knepel

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Susan M. Knepel, Torts: Child May Recover for Loss of Parent's Society and Companionship. Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508,
344 N.W.2d 513 (1984), 68 Marq. L. Rev. 174 (1984).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol68/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

TORTS - Child May Recover for Loss of Parent's Society
and Companionship. Theama v. City ofKenosha, 117 Wis. 2d
508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).
In 1975, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized a parent's right to recover for the loss of a minor child's aid, comfort, society, and companionship when the child is
negligently injured.' A child, however, had no reciprocal
cause of action. "It was not easy to understand and appreciate [the] reluctance to compensate the child who has been
deprived of the care, companionship and education of his
that matter his father, through the defendant's
mother, or for
2
negligence."
In Theama v. City of Kenosha 3 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court overcame this reluctance by creating a cause of action
on behalf of a child for loss of a parent's society and companionship when the parent is negligently injured by a third
party. This Note discusses the Theama decision and the
possible procedural problems the court may face in the future as a result of the decision.
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Robert Theama was seriously injured when the motorcycle he was driving struck a deep hole in the road.5 The injuries he sustained resulted in permanent brain damage,
permanent impairment of visual, perceptual, motor, and
speech functions, and other physical and emotional effects.
Robert Theama commenced an action to recover pecuniary damages against the City of Kenosha and its insurer alleging that the city was negligent for failing to provide
drivers sufficient street lighting. Patricia Theama, Robert's
wife, brought a claim for loss of support, society, companionship, and consortium. Tracy and Terry Theama, Robert's minor children, brought individual claims for loss of
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495, 501 (1975).
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 896 (4th ed. 1971).
117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).
See id at 519-20, 344 N.W.2d at 518.
Id. at 509, 344 N.W.2d at 513.

6. Id.
7. Id.
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their father's "care, society,
companionship, protection,
'8
training and guidance."

The City of Kenosha and its insurer moved for summary
judgment seeking a dismissal of the children's causes of action on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Relying on Cogger v.
Trudell,9 the trial court held that a minor child has no independent cause of action under the wrongful death statute
when one parent survives 0 and granted summary judgment
in favor of the city. The court of appeals summarily affirmed the trial court's order, but the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed. The court held that a minor child may recover for "the loss of care, society, companionship, protection, training, and guidance of a parent due to the negligent
acts of a third party,"" stating that the result "[was] man-2
dated by [its] oath to do justice, as well as [its] conscience."'
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACTION FOR Loss OF SOCIETY
AND COMPANIONSHIP

A.

The Father of a Family

Early common law was governed by the doctrine of paterfamiliaswhich vested all the family member's rights in the
father. 13 The father could recover the pecuniary value of
services no longer provided by an injured family member
and medical expenses.' 4 An action for loss of consortium
originated in suits involving interference with the marital re8. Id. at 510, 344 N.W.2d at 513.
9. 35 Wis. 2d 350, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967).
10. Wis. STAT. § 895.04(1) (1973) provided that "[ain action for wrongful death
may be brought by the personal representative of the deceased person or by the person to whom the amount recovered belongs."
11. Theama 117 Wis. 2d at 510, 344 N.W.2d at 514.
12. Id.at 519-20, 344 N.W.2d at 518.
13. See generally Note, The Child's Right to Suefor Loss ofa Parent'sLove, Care
and CompanionshipCausedby TortiousInjury to the Parent," 56 B.U.L. REv.722,724
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Child'sRight to Sue]; Note, Negligent Injury to Parents - The Casefor the Child's Right to Recoverfor Loss of ParentalSociety and
Companionship, 1982 S.ILL. L.J. 557, 558 [hereinafter cited as Note, Negligent Injury
to Parents].
14. heamna 117 Wis. 2d at 511, 344 N.W.2d at 514.
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lationship. 15 Eventually, services became one small part of
the damages, and loss of consortium became the most important element.' 6 The husband or father could recover for
loss of the society or services of a wife or child. However, at
this same time, a wife or child could not recover if they were
deprived of their husband's or father's loss of society or services. Even if the mother was widowed and supporting a
child who was injured, she could not recover for the child's
injuries because the right to recover was vested in the father. 7 Only when the wife's interests were directly invaded,
could she bring an action for loss of consortium.' 8
B. W!fe's Action
In 1950, the District of Columbia became the first jurisdiction to recognize a wife's cause of action for recovery of
the loss of her husband's consortium when he was negligently injured. 9 In Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.20 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that both the husband and the wife had equal rights to one another's love,
and therefore, the wife should have the right to maintain an
action for loss of consortium. 2' The Hitaffer court defined
consortium to include not only material services, but also
"love, affection, companionship, sexual relations, etc., all
welded into a conceptualistic unity. 2 2 Other jurisdictions
have followed the Hitaffer holding, and now, most jurisdic23
tions recognize the wife's cause of action.
Some decisions, including the 1955 Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision in Nickel v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co.,2 4
15. See Note, JudicialTreatment ofNegligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLUM.
L. REv. 1341, 1343 (1961).
16. See Note, Negligent Injury to Parents,supra note 13, at 558.
17. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Yaw, 290 Pa. Super. 535,_ 434 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1981).
18. See Note, Child's Right to Sue, supranote 13, at 725. The wife's interests were
directly invaded by seduction, enticement, or alienation of affections in the marital

relationship.
19. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 852 (1950).
20. Id.
21. See id.at 816.
22. Id.at 814.
23. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 450, 563 P.2d 858,
864, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 308 (1977).
24. 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955).
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refused to recognize a wife's cause of action on the basis that
such a cause of action could lead to double recovery. 5
However, the reluctance to create a wife's cause of action for
loss of consortium slowly declined. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Moran v. QualityAluminum Casting Co., 26 decided
twelve years after Nickel, recognized changing social conditions, overruled earlier precedent, and allowed the wife to
recover.2 7 However, the court retained a safeguard against
the risk of double recovery by requiring that a wife's action
be joined with her husband's action. 8
C. Parents Action
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized a parent's
cause of action for loss of a minor child's society and companionship in Shockley v. Prier.29 The 1975 Shockley decision was the first to discuss the merits of the cause of
action.3" The Shockley court based its holding on the Wisconsin wrongful death statute3' and the "shattering effect" a
child's injury can have on the parent-child relationship.32
Reasoning that the wrongful death statute allowed recovery
for loss of society and companionship, the court concluded it
was only reasonable to recognize the action when there has
been an injury to a minor child.3 The Shockley court also
noted that the relationship between parents and children
was, or at least should have been, more than that between
master and servant,34 and thus a parent's action should be
35
recognized.
25. See id. at 652, 70 N.W.2d at 208.
26. 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
27. See id. at 551-52, 150 N.W.2d at 141.
28. See id. at 558, 150 N.W.2d at 145.
29. 66 Wis. 2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495, 501 (1975).
30. See Note, Cause ofAction by ParentsSustained/orLoss of Society and Companionshp of Child Tortiously Injured, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 641, 644.
31. Wis. STAT. § 895.04(4) (1981-82). Prior to 1951 only parents were allowed to
recover under the statute. The legislature amended the statute in 1951 to allow children to recover under the wrongful death statute. See 1951 Wis. Laws 634.
32. Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d at 401, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
33. See id.at 400, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
34. See id. at 402, 225 N.W.2d at 500.
35. See id. at 401, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
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Prior to the Shockley decision, other jurisdictions had allowed parents to recover for loss of a child's society and
companionship. However, these courts did not directly discuss the merits of the issue,36 and several other courts have
refused to recognize the cause of action. 37 The California
Supreme Court, for example, stated that the policy reasons
for refusing to recognize the child's claim are indistinguishable from those38policy reasons which refuse to recognize the
parent's claim.
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD'S CAUSE OF ACTION

After examining the emerging rights of children and the
magnitude of the child's loss, a child's action for loss of society and companionship was first recognized in 1978. 39 Currently, six jurisdictions-Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin-allow a child's
cause of action for loss of a parent's society and
companionship. 4°
However, the majority of jurisdictions that have examined the child's claim have denied recovery. 4 1 Neverthe36. See Note, supra note 30, at 644.
37. See, e.g., Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353, 1358 (10th Cir. 1981); Smith
v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, _, 171 So. 2d 96, 100 (1965); Baxter v. Superior Court,
19 Cal. 3d 461, 464, 563 P.2d 871, 872, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 316 (1977); Butler v.
Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812, 816-17 (Miss. 1972); Brennan v. Biber, 93 N.J. Super. 351,
225 A.2d 742, 752 (1966).
38. See Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 465, 563 P.2d 871, 874, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 318 (1977). For example, the Baxter court found that the intangibility of
the loss, the difficulty in measuring damages, and the danger of double recovery are
equally applicable to the parent's claim. Id.
39. Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, _, 267 N.W.2d 124, 125 (1978) (limiting
child's recovery for loss of society and companionship to instances when the parent is
severely injured). However, in Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, _ 303 N.W.2d 424,
427 (1981), the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's limitation and
no longer required that the parent be severely injured in order for the child to recover.
40. See Rosen v. Zorzos, 449 So. 2d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); AudubonExira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983),
overruling,Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's
Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303
N.W.2d 424 (1981); Ueland v. Reynolds Metal Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, - P.2d (1984); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).
41. See, e.g., Early v. United States, 474 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1973); Pleasant v.
Washington Sand and Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hoesing v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478 (D. Neb. 1980); Turner v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
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less, these jurisdictions have recognized the magnitude of the
child's loss and the impairment to the parent-child relationship which results when the parent is permanently injured.42
These courts "are keenly aware of the need of children for
the love, affection, society and guidance of their parent; and

any injury which diminishes the ability of a parent to meet
these needs is plainly a family tragedy, harming all members
of that community." 43 Yet, despite such a recognition, the
claims have been denied. 44 The reasons given by these
courts in refusing to recognize a child's claim have included:
45
(1) it is an issue that should be addressed by the legislature;
(2) the damages are too remote and uncertain;46 (3) there will
be an increase in the defendant's liability;47 (4) there will be
multiple claims and an increase in litigation; 48 and (5) the
plaintiff will enjoy double recovery.4 9
159 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1958); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441,
563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977); Hinde v. Butler, 35 Conn. Supp. 292, 408
A.2d 668 (1979); Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634 (1957); Koskela v. Martin, 91 IM.
App. 3d 568, 414 N.E.2d 1148-(1980); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57
(1962); McFarland v. Cathy, 349 So. 2d 486 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Salin v. Kloempken,
322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Bradford v. Union Elec. Co., 598 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979); General Electric v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Russell v.
Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical
Center, 84 A.D.2d 17, 445 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1981); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266
(N.D. 1980); Gibson v. Johnston, 75 Abs. 413, 144 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956),
appeal dismissed, 166 Ohio St. 288, 141 N.E.2d 767 (1957); Norwest v. Presbyterian
Intercommunity Hosp., 52 Or. App. 853, 631 P.2d 1377 (1981); Erhardt v. Havens,
Inc., 53 Wash. 2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958).
42. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, _, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (1962).
43. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 453, 563 P.2d 858, 866, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 310 (1977).
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Koskela v. Martin, 91 11. App. 3d 568, _ 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1150
(1980).
46. See, e.g., Block v. Pielet Bros. Scrap & Metal, Inc., 119 Inl. App. 3d 983, _
457 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1983).
47. See, e.g., Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, _, 295 A.2d 862, 864
(1972).
48. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, _, 368 P.2d 57, 59-60 (1962).
49. See, e.g., Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill.
App. 3d 568, _, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151
(1980); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, ..._, 368 P.2d 57, 60 (1962).
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THE COURT'S REFUTATION OF THE REASONS FOR
DENYING THE ACTION

A.

Deference to the Legislature

Some courts have refused to create a child's cause of action for loss of society and companionship on the basis that
such a cause of action should be created by the legislature.50
Supposedly, the legislature is better suited for making sure
that all aspects of the issue are considered and protected.-"
In other jurisdictions, the courts have held that they are prohibited from creating a cause of action because of existing
legislation concerning loss of consortium.5 2 Judicial decisions which defer to the legislature to create a child's cause
of action for loss of society and companionship are basically
53
policy decisions to avoid the expansion of tort liability.
The Theama court refused to defer to the legislature.
Since an action for loss of society and companionship was
developed and created by the courts a the Wisconsin
Supreme Court believed that a deferral to the legislature
would be a "shirking" of its responsibility. 5 The court further believed that "[t]he genius of the common law is its ability to adapt itself to the changing needs of society. '56
Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that it had the
power to create a child's cause of action for loss of parental
50. See, e.g., Koskela v. Martin, 91 11. App. 3d at __ 414 N.E.2d at 1151 (1962).
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Comment, Who Should Recoverfor Loss of Consortium, 35 ME. L.
REv.295, 311 (1983). In Maine, the wife's right to recover for loss of consortium was
established by statute. See id. See also Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity
Hosp., 52 Or. App. 853, _, 631 P.2d 1377, 1378 (1981) (the law concerning the family
relationships in Oregon, including the mother's right to bring an action for injury to
her child, is based on the legislature's actions). Cf.Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 512-13,
344 N.W.2d at 515 (the wife's and parents' causes of action for loss of society and
companionship were created by the court).
53. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858,
862, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266, 267 (N.D.

1980).
54. Note, Child's Right to Sue, supra note 13, at 729.
55. See Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 521, 344 N.W.2d at 519.
56. Id.at 513, 344 N.W.2d at 515 (citing Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting
Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 551, 150 N.W.2d 137, 141 (1967). See also Salin v. Kloempken,
322 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982) (court refused to recognize the child's action, but
stated that the court had a duty to keep the common law in accordance with the
changing society).
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society and companionship.57 After determining that it had
the power to create the cause of action, the Theama court
discussed and rejected various arguments employed by other
courts for declining to create a child's cause of action for loss
of society and companionship.
B.

Remoteness and Uncertainty of Damages

One argument rejected by the Theama court was the re-

moteness and uncertainty of damages. 58 Loss of society and
companionship is considered to be an intangible, nonpecuniary loss 59 which makes assessment of pecuniary damages
difficult.6° One court has questioned whether the loss can
61
even be compensated. In Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.

the California Supreme Court said, "[compensation] will
simply establish a fund so that upon reaching adulthood,
when plaintiffs will be less in need of material guidance, they
will be unusually wealthy men and women." 62 The Theama
court found this argument unpersuasive because damages

for loss of consortium are allowable in other actions such as
for pain and suffering in personal injury claims, wrongful
death claims, and in spouses' and parents' claims when the
other spouse or a child is injured.63 The court also stated

that monetary compensation was the only solution our system has found. It said that even if it cannot compensate for
the loss, such compensation is preferable to completely denying recovery.64
57. See Theama; 117 Wis. 2d at 521, 344 N.W.2d at 519.
58. See, for example, the discussion in Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, _, 368
P.2d 57, 58 (1962).
59. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 449, 563 P.2d 858, 863,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1977).
60. See, e.g., Koskela v. Martin, 91 IMI.
App. 3d 568, _ 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151
(1980).
61. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal Rptr. 302 (1977).
62. Id. at 448, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306. "To say that plaintiffs have
been 'compensated' for their loss is superficial; in reality they have suffered a loss for
which they can never be compensated; they have obtained, instead, a future benefit
essentially unrelated to that loss." Id. Cf.Theama 117 Wis. 2d at 523, 344 N.W.2d at
520. The court stated that money can ease the child's adjustment to the loss without
making the child wealthy. Id.
63. See Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 522, 344 N.W.2d at 519-20. See also Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. 1983) (recovery for loss of consortium is not too
uncertain to deny recovery).
64. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 523, 344 N.W.2d at 520.
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C. Increase in Defendant's Liability
The Theama court also addressed the argument of the
inevitable increase in defendant's liability upon recognition
of the child's action. Some courts have stated that there
appears to be a trend for widening the circle of justice to all
family members who have claims.66 In fact, "[tihose courts
that refuse to recognize a parent's or child's action know that
brothers and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren, as well
as aunts, uncles, nieces and nephews are waiting in the
wings. 6 7 However, the Theama court found no difficulty in
limiting the action to the persons most likely to be severely
affected by the injury.6 8 Any burden placed on society because of the child's action would be offset by the benefit received by the child. 9 Ideally, the child would become a
normal adult. 70
D. Multile Claims and Increase in Litigation
The Theama court summarily disposed of the issue of
multiple claims by holding that the issue was not before the
court since the Theama children's claims were joined with
the parent's claims. 7' However, the court did address the argument that the child's action will cause an increase in litigation.72 Every permanent injury to a parent creates the

65. See id.at 524-25, 344 N.W.2d at 521.
66. See, e.g., Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill.
App. 3d 568, __ 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1150

(1980).
67. See Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-ChildRelationship: Loss ofan
InjuredPerson's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 509, 605 (1976). The "ulti-

mate question" is where the line should be drawn between liability and nonliability.
Id
68. See Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 524, 344 N.W.2d at 521.
69. Id.at 525, 344 N.W.2d at 521.
70. Id
71. Id at 526, 344 N.W.2d at 521. However, in Shockley v. Prior, 66 Wis. 2d 394,

404,225 N.W.2d 495, 501 (1975), the court required mandatory joinder of the parent's
action for the loss of a child's society and companionship.
72. See, e.g., Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, -

(1972).

295 A.2d 862, 864
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possibility of a claim on the behalf of each child. 3 Thus,
settlements may be hindered, and litigation in each case
could become quite expensive.' Moreover, injuries to both
parents would further increase litigation which can be multiplied by the number of minor children in the fawly. 7" In
response, the Theama court simply answered that the fear of
increased litigation argument was always raised when a new
cause 7of
action was created, and thus, the argument had no
6
merit.

E Double Recovery
The final argument addressed by the Theama court was
the fear of double recovery.77 Courts that have refused to
recognize a child's action argue that juries will consider the
child's situation when assessing the parent's damages. 78 The
Yheama court analogized the child's cause of action to the
spouse's cause of action. It noted that the possibility for
double recovery exists in a spouse's action, and, hence, dismissed this argument.79 Moreover, the court gave a possible
solution to the problem "by limiting the injured parent's recovery to the child's loss of the parent's pecuniary ability to
support the child."80 Thus, the court found none of the reasons for denying recovery persuasive.
V. THE CouRT's REASONS FOR CREATING THE AcTION
The Theama court created a child's cause of action for
Xoms 0i Sodae-] an& womaioixsp bcast ix. vwa ov
73. See Garza v. Kantor, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 1026, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164, 165
(1976) (three children seeking to recover $250,000 each); Borer v. American Airlines,
Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 445, 563 P.2d 858, 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (1977) (nine
children seeking $100,000 each); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165,, 368 P.2d 57,58
(1962) (three children seeking to recover $50,000 each).
74. See, eg., Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill.
App. 3d 568, , 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151
(1980).
75. See, ag., Russell v. Salem Tramp. Co., 61 NJ. 502, , 295 A.2d 862, 864
(1972).
76. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 526, 344 N.W.2d at 521.
77. See, eg., Koskela v. Martin, 91 M11.
App. 3d 568, _, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151
(1980); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, __,368 P.2d 57, 58 (1962).

78. See, eg., Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, _ 368 P.2d 57, 58-59 (1962).
79. See Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 526, 344 N.W.2d at 522.
80. Id Likewise, the child's cause of action can also be limited to just the loss of
the parent's society and companionship. Id
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and "mandated by [its] oath to do justice, as well as [its] conscience.""1 First, the court recognized the hierarchical development of the action. The husband-wife relationship was
first protected; then the parents' interests were protected; and
now "[ilt is only logical that the next step in this progression
is to protect the child's interest in the parent-child relationship. 3' 2 Secondly, the court recognized the magnitude of the
child's loss. The court stated that the Theama children were
deprived of more than the enjoyment of shared experiences
with their father and that "a child may be virtually helpless
in seeking out a new companion. 8 3 Finally, the court recognized that the status of children has changed. Children are
"persons deserving of legal rights and protections. 8 4 Thus,
the court held that the reasons for recognizing the minor
child's action outweighed the reasons for refusing to recognize the action. 5
VI.

ANALYSIS

Since the action for loss of consortium was created by the
courts, they have the power to determine whether a society
and companionship cause of action for the child exists.86
However, just because the courts may have the power to create the cause of action does not compel them to do so. The
Theama decision should have "taken into account [public
policy] considerations in addition to logical symmetry and
sympathetic appeal. 87 Before the new cause of action was
created, its possible effect on the judicial system should have
been addressed. The Theama court failed to consider not
only the consequences its decision will have on the judicial
system, but it also failed to address key procedural issues.
81. Id at 520, 344 N.W.2d at 518.
82. Id at 519, 344 N.W.2d at 518.
83. Id. at 516, 344 N.W.2d at 516. See also Note, Child's Right to Sue, supra note
13, at 742. An adult is capable of developing new relationships to remedy the deprivation of "emotional warmth." Id.
84. Theamza 117 Wis. 2d at 516, 344 N.W.2d at 517. See also supranotes 39-40
and accompanying text.
85. 117 Wis. 2d at 527, 344 N.W.2d at 522.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
87. Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 747, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (1975).
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A.

Consequences on the JudicialSystem

First, the Theama court's statement that it had no difficulty limiting the action for loss of society and companionship to the husband-wife relationship and the parent-child
relationship fails to rebut the argument that there will be an
accompanying increase in the defendant's liability. 8 Any
court can enlarge the cause of action to other family members by employing the "limiting" language. For example, a
sibling can suffer a severe loss when its brother or sister is
permanently injured. Thus, a court presented with the sibling issue can simply hold that it is limiting the action to the
already recognized causes of action and to the sibling. However, such reasoning fails to prevent a further enlarging of
the circle of recovery. A continuation of this reasoning will
lead to a further recognition of other family members' actions for loss of society and companionship. After all, each
court that is faced with the action can "limit" the action.
Second, the Theama court completely failed to address
the issue of multiple claims. It stated that it did not have to
address this issue since the Theama children's claims were
joined with the parent's claims. 89 Thus, it is conceivable that
nine children could have nine separate lawsuits. No joinder
of claims was required in Theama.90 In addition, minors can
bring a cause of action two years after gaining the age of
majority. 9 1 Thus, these nine separate lawsuits have the possibility of being brought over a long period of time. Such a
burden on an already overburdened judicial system should
have been addressed and resolved before the child's action
was created.
Moreover, by simply asserting that fears of increased liti88. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
89. "Because each child of an injured parent would possess his or her own cause
of action, multiple lawsuits could potentially arise from one occurrence." Theama,
117 Wis. 2d at 525-26, 314 N.W.2d at 521. See supra text accompanying note 75.
90. In Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495, 501 (1975), the
supreme court required joinder of the parent's cause of action for loss of the child's
society and companionship with the child's action for damages.
91. Wis. STAT. § 893.18 (1981-82), Wisconsin's disability tolling statute, provides
that "[i]f a person entitled to bring an action is, at the time the cause of action accrues
.. . under the age of 18 years. . . the action may be commenced within 2 years after
the disability ceases. .... "
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gation are always raised with new causes of action,92 the
Theama court failed to rebut the argument that recognition
of a child's action will not increase litigation. Just because
"wolf" has been cried before does not mean we should disregard the warning. Because the Theama court failed to examine and resolve this issue, nine children with two injured
parents can bring eighteen claims. Clearly this is an increase
in litigation. The Theama court failed to properly address
these very important issues. The Theama court did not analyze how the decision would affect public policy. The court's
opinion implied sympathy for the Theama children and was
aimed at a result rather than at a fair examination and resolution of the issue. Perhaps if these three major reasons for
refusing to recognize a child's action had been examined, a
child's action may not have been created.
B. ProceduralQuestions
Furthermore, several procedural issues will arise as a result of this decision. First, there must be a creation of an
applicable statute of limitation for a child's action and a determination of when the child's cause of action accrues.93
Similarly, in the case of the parent's cause of action for loss
of a child's society and companionship, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court had to determine whether a parent, like a
child, would also receive the benefit of the disability statute.
Four years after the parent's action was created, 94 the parents were also granted the benefit of the disability tolling
statute.95 A further question presented is whether the child's
action accrues when the injury is sustained by the parent or
92. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
93. For loss of parental society and companionship in Massachusetts, the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the child reaches majority. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 7 (West 1979).
94. In 1975, the parents' cause of action was created. Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis.
2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495, 501 (1975). The determination of the applicable statute
of limitation was made in 1983. See Korth v. American Family Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d
326, 334, 340 N.W.2d 494, 497 (1983).
95. See Korth v. American Family Ins. Co, 115 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 340 N.W.2d
494, 497 (1983). The Wisconsin court granted the parents the benefit of the disability
statutes because "no great burden [was] imposed on the defendants since they...
had to preserve evidence or maintain their readiness to defend the minor's claim." Id.
at 333, 340 N.W.2d at 497. See supra note 91 for Wisconsin's disability statute
provisions.
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when the child realizes or should have realized the loss. 96 If
the cause of action accrues when the child realized or should
have realized the loss, it will be difficult to ascertain the day
a three month old child felt the loss of his or her father's or
mother's society and companionship.97
Additionally, there is the question of whether an unborn
child at the time of a parent's injury has a cause of action.98
The resolution of this issue in Wisconsin will depend on the
legal status of a fetus at the time the cause of action arises. 99
Moreover, a system for the apportionment of damages
must be created. The apportionment of damages could have
a "shattering effect" on the family. If the damages are not
evenly apportioned, one child may feel that another sibling
was unfairly compensated, creating resentment and disharmony in the family. The awards could be evenly apportioned, but this method would be unfair to a two year old
child who has to develop without the normal parent whereas
a seventeen year old child has had the benefit of a normal
parent during childhood. Furthermore, an even apportionment would be unfair to a child who had a "close" relationship with the parent and will thus experience a deeper loss
than a child who had a distant relationship. There is also
the question of whether there should be an even apportionment for natural and step children. If natural and step children have the same relationship with the parent, an uneven
apportionment based on their legal status may disrupt the
96. One court has held that because the child's cause of action arose out of the
same accident as the parent's action, the child's action is also barred if the statute of
limitations has already run on the parent's claim. See Armstrong v. Carlyle Constr.
Co., 532 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D. Mass. 1982).
97. Cf. Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353, 1359 (10th Cir. 1981). A two and
one-half year old child was given an overdose of a sedative at a medical center which
resulted in permanent physical and mental impairments. The court held that "it is
impossible to establish a precise standard for measuring damages." Id.
98. See Salin v. Koempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 737 (Minn. 1982) (one of the children seeking to recover for loss of parental society was born twelve weeks after the
parent's accident).
99. The legal status of a fetus has not yet been determined. In Kwaterski v. State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 N.W.2d 107, 112 (1967), the supreme court
held that a viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of Wis. STAT. § 331.03
(1963) (now Wis. STAT. § 895.03 (1981-82)), which described who is entitled to bring
a wrongful death action. However, the Kwaterski court refused to decide whether a
nonviable fetus was also a "person." Id.
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family unit. This issue must be resolved when there is more
than one child seeking to recover.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Wisconsin Supreme Court created a cause of action
based on its conscience. It failed to address and rebut some
of the most important reasons for refusing to recognize the
child's loss of society and companionship action. This decision failed to take into account public policy and improperly
balanced the rights and duties of the Theama parties with
society as a whole. The court has created a cause of action
which has the possibility of placing an unreasonable burden
on the courts and disrupting the family relationship which it
so desired to protect. If these problems manifest themselves,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court may find itself limiting the
Theama holding in future decisions.
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